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APPEAL
I. Foiu AND REQUISrrMS
A. Non-CompZiance With Supreme Court Rules
In Jones v. Dague' the defendant, a seventeen-year-old high
school student, was the driver of an automobile in which the de-
ceased, one Susan Jones, was riding. On a curve to the left, the
right wheels of the vehicle ran off the pavement. The automobile
had proceeded thus a distance of 228 feet when the defendant-
driver turned the wheels abruptly to the left in order to return
to the pavement. The vehicle rolled several times inflicting fatal
injuries on the deceased. In a wrongful death action the jury re-
turned a verdict in favor of the deceased's parents of $25,000 in
which the life expectancy of the beneficiaries was not considered.
The defendants appealed from an order of the lower court re-
fusing their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
and, in the alternative, for a new trial. The defendant-appellants
argued, inter alia, that the life expectancy of the beneficiaries
should have been considered.2 The appellant contended that the
leading case of Trimmier v. Atlanta & C.A.L. Ry.4 should be
overruled, because the weight of authority and reason support
the contrary view that, since the only damages recoverable in a
wrongful death action, under our statute, are those sustained by
the beneficiary for whose benefit the action is brought, the life
expectancy of the beneficiary is properly to be taken into consid-
eration in measuring the beneficiary's loss occasioned by the
death.4
The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that while there is
some doubt as to the soundness of the Trimmier rule, the plain-
1. 166 S.E2d 99 (S.C. 1969).
2. Brief for Appellant at 7. The father and mother of the deceased were
62 and 61 years old respectively.
3. 81 S.C. 203, 62 S.E. 209 (1908). The South Carolina Supreme Court
enunciated the following principle in deciding Trinuer:
We fail to see wherein the probable duration of the father's life
has any relevancy to the issues involved, as the amount recovered
is the absolute property of the beneficiary, under the terms of the
statute.
81 S.C. at 213, 62 S.E. at 212.
Two years later the Trimmer decision was reaffirmed by Turbyfill v. Atlanta
& C. Air Lines Ry., 86 S.C. 379,, 68 S.E. 687 (1910).
4. Brief of Appellant at 7-9. See also 22 Am. Juma 2d Death § 162 (1965);
25A C.J.S. Death § 121 (1966); Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 478 at 530 (1950).
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tiff-respondent was entitled to the application of the principle of
stare decisis to the present case because the appellant had
not requested permission in the prescribed manner that Timmier
be overruled. Rule 8, Section 10 of the Rules of the Supreme
Court governs the procedure to be employed when a decision of
the Court is sought to be reviewed, modified, or overruled.5
In State v. WFakerG the defendant entered a plea of guilty to
the charges of resisting an officer, or resisting arrest, and assault
and battery of a high and aggravated nature. Circuit Judge J.
B. Ness sentenced the defendant to be confined upon the public
works of Newberry County or the State Penitentiary for three
years, suspended upon the serving of twelve months, and three
years probation on both indictments to run concurrently.
On appeal, the defendant-appellant contended that since the
two charges were inseparable and constituted identical acts, it
was error to sentence him to a single general sentence on the sep-
arate counts in the indictments, charging separate offenses. The
defendant's appeal was based solely on the principle established
in State v. HolZarn,. In the HolMwn case, the defendant was
convicted of resisting an officer and assault and battery of a high
and aggravated nature. But on appeal, the South Carolina Su-
preme Court held in that case that where the conclusion was in-
evitable that the assault on an officer was inseparable from de-
fendant's resistance of arrest, the offense was essentially and
substantially the single one, and the defendant could not be pun-
ished for each offense separately.8 However, the court in Walker
emphasized that in the Holwnum decision two justices concurred
in the main opinion, one concurred only in its result, and two
justices dissented. Thus, the value of Holknma as a precedent is,
at best, questionable." Unfortunately, the case at bar was not de-
5. Rule 8, Section 10 of the Rules of the Supreme Court provides:
Counsel desiring to attack or argue against a decision of this
Court, with a view to asking the Court to review, modify, or over-
rule the same, must petition the Court in writing, at least four days
before the call of the case in which such argument is sought to
be made, ashing permission to do so, and set forth the reasons
why the decisions in question should be reviewed, modified, or
overruled. (Emphasis added.)
6. 166 S.E.2d 209 (S.C. 1969).
7. 232 S.C. 489, 102 S.E.2d 873 (1958).
8. Id.
9. See generally Hyder v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 183 S.C. 98, 190
S.E. 239 (1937); Moseley v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 167 S.C. 112, 166 S.E.
94 (1932). The following principal of law is expressed at 20 Am. JUL- 2d
Courts § 195 (1965) (footnotes omitted):
A decision by an equally divided court does not establish a pre-
[Vol. 21
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cided upon the validity of Holman as a precedent. The court
concluded that it was unnecessary to determine the case's pre-
cedential value since the appellant's identity-of-charges conten-
tion had not been raised in the lower court. Since the question
did not go to the jurisdiction of the subject matter, the defendant
was not entitled to raise or have the issue considered on appeal.
After reviewing the record and rejecting the appellant's other
contentions as well, the court ominously added that the entire ap-
peal could have been dismissed because of the failure of counsel
to comply with Supreme Court Rule 8.10
B. Divorce Appeal Considered In pite of Non-Compliance
In one case the supreme court considered the principal conten-
tion of the appellant, in an attempt to reconcile a marital dispute.
despite non-compliance with the pertinent appellate rules. In
Neves v. Neves" the Family Court of Greenville County granted
the respondent-wife a divorce on grounds of physical cruelty and
awarded her attorney's fees. On appeal the supreme court stated
at the outset that it was at least doubtful whether any of the hus-
ban's exceptions were sufficiently framed or stated to properly
present any issues for the decision of the court. However, the
court chose to consider the husband's principal contention in
order to protect the interest of the state in the preservation of
marriage. Nevertheless, the decision of the lower court was ul-
timately affirmed.
C. Issue Not Argued In Brief
The effect of presenting on appeal a question not argued in the
brief was illustrated in Young v. Warr.12 The plaintiff was in-
jured in a collision while being driven by the defendant's de-
ceased to pick up another automobile and drive it back to a shop
for reconditioning."3 The plaintiff, a 23-year-old married man
cedent required to be followed under the stare decisis doctrine.
And where the members of the court unanimously or by a majority
vote reach a decision but cannot, even by a majority agree on the
reasoning therefor, no point of law is established by the decision
and it cannot be a precedent covered by the stare decisis rule.
10. The court did not specify what breaches of Rule 8 it had in mind. Rule
8 is composed of 12 sections governing the form and content of appellate briefs.
11. 167 S.E.2d 568 (S.C. 1969).
12. 165 S.E2d 797 (S.C. 1969).
13. The deceased and plaintiff's father worked for a firm in the business
of reconditioning automobiles for resale purposes. The automobiles were
obtained from various places in the eastern portion of the United States. The
plaintiff was on a 16 day Christmas leave from the United States Navy, and
he made the fatal trip to pick up a car for reconditioning mainly to spend
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who had been earning $325 monthly, was intelligent, industrious,
and had a substantial future earning capacity, received a jury
verdict for $500,00014 for a paraplegia-producing injury to his
spine and lumbar area. As a result of the injury, the plaintiff
could not learn to walk again and had lost control of his bladder
and bowel functions as well as the ability for sexual function.
The defendant-appellant charged, on appeal, that the trial judge
erred in refusing appellant's motions for non-suit, directed ver-
dict and judgment non obstante veredicto or for a new trial ab-
solute on the ground that the only reasonable inference to be
drawn from the evidence was that the accident was solely and
proximately caused by a tractor-trailer truck.15 The supreme
court rejected the charge because the question was not argued in
the brief of the appellant.1
Appellant also urged that the trial court erred in refusing his
motions for judgment non obstante veredicto or for a new trial ab-
solute upon the ground that the amount of the verdict was so ex-
cessive as to indicate bias, prejudice, caprice, arbitrariness or mis-
apprehension on the part of the jury. The supreme court held
that where the verdict is deemed excessive by the trial judge, in
the sense that it indicates merely undue liberality on the part of
the jury, the trial judge alone has the power and with it the re-
sponsibility of setting aside the verdict absolutely or reducing it
by granting a new trial nisi. 7 Only when the verdict is so gross-
ly excessive and the amount awarded so shockingly dispropor-
tionate to the injuries as to indicate that the jury was moved or
actuated by passion, caprice, prejudice, or other considerations
not founded on the evidence, does it become the duty of the su-
preme court, as well as of the trial court, to set aside the verdict
absolutely.""
A third contention was that the trial judge erred by not per-
mitting appellant to argue that "if the driver of the truck were
negligent, the plaintiff also has a cause of action against him,"
and in allowing the respondent's attorney in his closing argument
to say: "Richard Young, whose Father testified against him:
14. The trial judge granted a motion of the appellant for a new trial nisi
unless plaintiff agreed to the remission of the sum of $100,000. The respondent
filed his remittitur of this sum within the time limit.
15. The automobile driven by the deceased collided with the rear of the truck.
16. Kolb v. Nash, 245 S.C. 25, 138 S.E2d 417 (1964); Field v. Gregory,
230 S.C. 39, 94 S.E2d 15 (1956). See also S.C. SuP. CT. R. 8(2).
17. Gray v. Davis, 247 S.C. 536, 148 S.E2d 682 (1966).
18. Ray v. Simon, 245 S.C. 346, 140 S.E2d 575 (1965).
[Vol. 21
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what a cold, cruel world this is."' 9 The court declared that the
control of counsels' argument is left very much to the discretion
of the trial judge who is present at the trial and in a much
better position than the supreme court to judge what is improper
argument.
20
Lastly, the appellant asserted that the trial judge erred in
charging the jury twice that he had stricken the third defense of
the defendant-appellant, to wit: that the respondent and the ap-
pellant's intestate were fellow employees and were subject to and
covered by the South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act so
that the respondent was barred from bringing a common law ac-
tion for damages against his fellow employee. The supreme court
indicated that one clear statement of a proposition of law should
be enough. However, a judgment would not be reversed because
of a repetition in a charge to the jury unless the repetition was
prejudicial and it reasonably appeared that the jury was misled
thereby. According, the repetition of correct instructions so that
the jury may have the matter firmly in mind is not erroneous.
21
D. Issue Not Raised In Lower Court
Jarrell v. Jarrell= involved a divorce action in which the de-
fendant-husband defaulted and the plaintiff-wife was awarded
custody of their two children and $125 per month for child sup-
port. Eight months later the divorced wife asked for an increase
in allowance for child support. Evidence was taken at the hear-
ing but not recorded. The appellant-husband raised no questions
as to the sufficiency of the allegations in the respondent's petition
and interposed no objections to the failure to record the testi-
mony. Consequently, the lower court ordered the husband to pay
the sum of $225 monthly.
On appeal2 3 the husband contended that the default divorce de-
cree should have been considered res judicata and that the lower
court had no power to modify such a decree in the absence of al-
legations and proof of a substantial change of condition. The
supreme court held that the record failed to show that the ap-
19. Appellant contended that Richard Young's father had been subpoenaed
and placed on the witness stand by the appellant; therefore, opposing counsel's
statement should have been stricken.
20. Shearer v. DeShon, 240 S.C. 472, 126 S.E2d 514 (1962).
21. Accord, 88 C.J.S. Trial § 334 (1955).
22. 164 S.E2d 572 (S.C. 1968).
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pellant's contentions were in any manner presented to or passed
upon by the trial court ;24 therefore, they were not entitled to be
comsidered on appeal. Thus the appeal was dismissed.
25
The plaintiff in Cooper v. Fireme.'8 Fund Ims. Co. 28 had a
collision with a pickup truck owned by O'Neal Tanner and
driven by Harry Anderson. The plaintiff brought suit against
Firemen's Fund Insurance Company and State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company to collect the amount of his
judgment against Tanner and Anderson, their respective in-
sureds. Both companies denied coverage on the ground that An-
derson was driving the pickup truck without Tanner's permis-
sion. The trial judge entered a directed verdict for the defend-
ants because of the fact that the plaintiff failed to establish
permissive use. The appellant argued that even though Ander-
son drove the pickup truck without permission, the exclusion con-
tained in the Firemen's Fund policy was void because of a con-
flict with Section 46-750.31 of the South Carolina Code.27 The
supreme court, in affirming the lower court decision, concluded
that nothing in the record indicated that this question was pre-
sented or passed upon by the trial judge, and it was, therefore,
not properly before the court for determination.
28
The fate awaiting an issue raised for the first time on appeal
was again demonstrated in Yarborough v. Yarboroug, 2 9 an ac-
tion for partition of land. When the master filed his report the
defendant excepted to it but failed to assign a ground for doing
so. The trial court therefore overruled the exception. The defend-
ant appealed, contending that a portion of the master's finding
was unsupported by the evidence. The supreme court held that
the issue was raised for the first time on appeal, and that a ques-
24. The court stated that the record affirmatively showed the appellant to
have consented, or at least not to have objected, to the testimony taken by the
lower court. At any rate the evidence was not a part of the record, and thus
the court could not pass upon any alleged insufficiency of proof. See, e.g.,
South Carolina Nat'l Bank of Charleston v. B.H. Stepp Co., 248 S.C. 521, 151
S.E.2d 752 (1966).
25. Cf., e.g., Mayer v. Master Feed & Grain Co., 250 S.C. 275, 157 S.E.2d
413 (1967).
26. 167 S.E.2d 745 (S.C. 1969).
27. See Brief for Respondent at 9-11.
28. See generally Mayer v. Master Feed & Grain Co., 250 S.C. 275, 157
S.E.2d 413 (1967); Rochester v. North Greenville Junior College, 249 S.C.
123, 153 S.E.2d 121 (1967); Stanley v. Reserve Ins. Co., 238 S.C. 533, 121
S.E.2d 10 (1961); Williamson v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 236 S.C.
101, 113 S.E.2d 345 (1960).
29. 251 S.C. 375, 162 S.E.2d 539 (1968).
[Vol. 21
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tion not presented to or passed on by the master or trial judge is
not properly before the appellate court for decision.
The same situation appeared in State v. White.30 Appellant
charged error on the part of the trial judge in allowing an in-
dictment imprinted with the word "murder" to go to the jury
after the judge had submitted only the reduced charge of involun-
tary manslaughter. The supreme court concluded, after careful-
ly considering the record, that the question posed was not raised
during the trial and accordingly dismissed the appeal.
The final case during the survey period which dealt with rais-
ing an issue for the first time at the appellate stage was Ford v.
Allied ChemicaZ Jorp.,31 a workman's compensation case. The
plaintiff was injured February 3, 1966, while working for the de-
fendant. Thereafter he worked a half day on February 7, none
on February 8, and part of the day on February 9 and 10. The
circuit court affirmed a compensation award by the Industrial
Commission in favor of the claimant in which the Commission
gave the defendant-employer credit for the one-half day that the
claimant worked on February 7. The defendant appealed from
the circuit court decree asserting that there was error in failing
also to give the employer credit for the other two days, February
9-10, that the claimant had worked.
The supreme court stated that the record showed that claimant
had worked on these two days, but not how long or how much he
was paid. The court concluded that the record failed to indicate
whether the issue was presented to either the full commission on
review or to the circuit court. Therefore, the contention required
no consideration and the judgment in favor of the claimant was
affirmed.
II. Tim REcoan
A. Portion Of The Record Lost
An interesting predicament arose in the case of China v. Par-
tott.3 2 The plaintiff, a pedestrian, was struck in an intersection
by an automobile driven by the defendant. At trial the jury re-
turned a verdict for plaintiff in the amount of $20,000, but upon
motion of the defendant, judgment notwithstanding the verdict
was entered by the trial judge on the grounds of contributory
30. Smith's Advance Sheet #23 (July 5, 1969).
31. 167 S.E.2d 564 (S.C. 1969).
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negligence. Complications arose on appeal due to the fact that
portions of the stenographic notes of the trial proceedings were
lost before they were transcribed by the court reporter. At the
trial, the plaintiff had withdrawn her demand for punitive dam-
ages and asked judgment only for actual damages. Subsequent-
ly, a dispute arose as to whether the withdrawal also operated to
withdraw the issue of the defendant's recklessness from the case.
The question of what had transpired in connection with plain-
tiff's withdrawal of the demand for punitive damages was sub-
mitted to the trial judge to determine in order to settle the case
for appeal.33
In order to reach a decision, the trial judge relied on three doc-
uments: his previous order granting a judgment n.o.v. in which
he concluded that the verdict of the jury "apparently exonerates
the defendant from anything more than simple negligence;" af-
fidavits of plaintiff's counsel; and an affidavit of the court re-
porter.3 4 The affidavits maintained that the plaintiff withdrew
her demand for punitive damages without withdrawing the issue
of defendant's recklessness, which was submitted to the jury for
determination. Accordingly, the order of the trial judge made a
factual statement in favor of the plaintiff a part of the record.
The defendant objected to the decision of the trial judge on the
grounds that he had considered the affidavits of the plaintiff's
counsel and the court reporter in determining what had tran-
spired at the trial. The supreme court held that it was proper
for the trial judge to consider these affidavits. Furthermore, the
court stated that where there is a disagreement as to what the
record on appeal should contain, the duty and responsibility of
settling the question rests upon the trial judge.35
B. Revelance Of Testimony Determined In, Light Of Record
In Wilson v. American Casuadty (G. 36 an action was instituted
by plaintiff for the third time37 to recover payments allegedly
33. The case was tried in June of 1965 and the affidavits used by the trial
judge in reaching a decision were signed in April and May 1967. Thus, there
was approximately a two year interval between the time of trial and the final
decision of what had transpired in the case.
34. An affidavit of appellant's counsel was not requested or employed in
reaching a conclusion.
35. S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-406 (1962); S.C. SuP. CT. R. 4(7); South Caro-
lina State Highway Dept. v. Meredith, 241 S.C. 306, 128 S.E.2d 179 (1962);
Southern Pine Lumber Co. v. Martin, 118 S.C. 319, 110 S.E. 804 (1921).
36. 166 S.E.2d 797 (S.C. 1969).
37. Twice before, in 1963 and 1964, defendant had ceased payment Plaintiff
had brought two actions, the first inducing defendant to resume payments and
the second resulting in a court order.
8
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due him under a policy of insurance issued by the defendant
wherein defendant agreed to make the monthly payments to the
holder of a mortgage on plaintiff's home in the event the plain-
tiff became totally disabled and for such period as disability con-
tinued. Plaintiff also sought recovery of expenses incurred as a
result of a foreclosure action instituted because of a prior refusal
of defendant to make the mortgage payments in accordance with
the policy terms.38 Paragraphs 6 through 9 of the complaint con-
tained allegations concerning these prior actions, including al-
legations that plaintiff was previously required to pay the ex-
penses of a foreclosure action, including attorney's fees, because
of the prior refusal of defendant to make the mortgage payments.
Before the trial defendant moved to strike the foregoing allega-
tions upon the grounds that they were irrelevant, immaterial, and
prejudicial. The trial court refused the motion, and evidence to
sustain the foregoing allegations was admitted over the objection
of the defendant. Subsequently a verdict was entered in favor of
the plaintiff in the amount of $1,160.46 of which $456.00 admit-
tedly represented recovery for the expenses incurred by plaintiff
in prior foreclosure proceedings.
The defendant appealed under exceptions which challenged the
relevance of the allegations in paragraphs 6 through 9 upon two
grounds. First, since this was an action on the policy of insur-
ance, the only issue in the case concerned the disability of plain-
tiff during the period covered by this action, and allegations and
proof of what transpired with reference to the determination of
prior claims of plaintiff for different periods were irrelevant, im-
material, and prejudicial.39 Secondly, defendant contended that
the expenses incurred by the plaintiff as a result of the institu-
tion of the foreclosure actions were not a proper element of dam-
age in this action and that the allegations appropriate to such re-
covery should have been stricken.40
The supreme court overruled the first exception since the ir-
relevance of the allegations did not clearly appear from the
pleadings. The relevance of the testimony offered in proof
thereof, or its prejudicial effect, could only be determined in
light of the trial record, which included only the pleadings and
none of the testimony.4 1 The second exception, however, was sus-
38. Record at 6; Brief for Respondent at 5.
39. Brief for Appellant at 6-7.
40. Id.
41. The burden is on the appellant to present a sufficient record from which
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tained on the basis that the allegations clearly showed that they
related to a claim totally unconnected with the present action.
The liability of the defendant for the alleged expenses and at-
torney's fees arose because of its refusal to make the mortgage
payments during a different period. Therefore, the alleged ex-
penses and attorney's fees were not proper elements of damage
in this action and allegations concerning them should have been
stricken as irrelevant.
C. Appeal Not Taken From Factual Finding Of Record
The case of Belue v. Fetne?.42 involved an action for the parti-
tion of real estate by sale. The lower court ruled that the plain-
tiff and defendants each had an undivided one-fifth interest in
the premises. On appeal one of defendants, one Jack D. Greene,
argued that he was the sole owner of the tract of land involved.
The supreme court held that the question was not properly raised
because Greene had not appealed from the lower court's ruling
that he and the other parties were the owners of a one-fifth un-
divided interest in the land.
A second instance in which a party failed to appeal the factual
findings of the lower court occurred in the case of Washington
Realty Co. v. Amerlean Mutual Fire Ins. Co.43 The plaintiff-ap-
pellant owned two buildings, insured by the defendant, in
Charleston which were damaged by fire. Defendant-respondent
denied liability for the damaged buildings, and plaintiff brought
an action to recover for the loss incurred thereby. Defendant's
answer alleged that the insured buildings had been vacant or un-
occupied for more than sixty days prior to the fire, thus suspend-
ing coverage in accordance with a policy provision which ex-
empted the defendant from liability.44 Plaintiff denied that the
buildings had been vacant or unoccupied, but if they were defen-
charged. Where, as in this case, the exceptions require consideration of trial
evidence which is not included in the record, such exceptions will not be
considered. See note 28 supra.
42. 164 S.E.2d 753 (S.C. 1968).
43. 167 S.E.2d 617 (S.C. 1969).
44. Lines 28 through 35 of the policy provided as follows:
28. Conditions suspending or restricting insurance. Unless
29. otherwise provided in writing added hereto this com-
30. pany shall not be liable for loss occuring
31. (a) while the hazard is increased by any means within
32. the control or knowledge of the insured; or
33. (b) while a described building, whether intended for
34. occupancy by owner or tenant, is vacant or unoccupied
35. beyond a period of sixty consecutive days ....
[Vol. 21
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dant was estopped to avail itself of the foregoing policy provi-
sion or had waived its rights to do so. The trial judge without a
jury entered a judgment for the defendant. Plaintiff sought to
preserve for review only the contentions that the defendant
waived its right to rely upon the fact that the buildings were
vacant or unoccupied or was estopped from doing so. A state-
ment in the record contained the following:
These and other facts of the case are set out in some de-
tail in the order of Judge Ness, and no appeal is taken
from these factual findings.
45
The supreme court held that such contentions would not be con-
sidered not only because the plaintiff disavowed challenge of the
factual findings but also because they required consideration of
trial evidence which was not included in the record.46
III. Srumncxcy orF FACTUAL FINDINGs BELOw
In Dargan v. Graves47 the supreme court reaffirmed the well
settled rule that concurrent factual findings by referee and trial
judge will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are without
evidentiary suport or are against the clear preponderance of the
evidence.
IV. STATEmNT IN TitAscurr NOT SUSTAINED By RECoRD
The calamity resulting from a statement in the transcript of
record that was not substantiated by the record as a whole ap-
peared in the case of Jones v. Massingae.4" Mrs. Jones brought
suit against the defendant for personal injuries inflicted upon
her in an automobile accident and her husband instituted
a complaint for medical bills and loss of consortium. Defend-
ant's answer alleged the execution and delivery of a general re-
lease in his favor signed by both plaintiffs as a bar to their respec-
tive actions. In the court-ordered reply, the plaintiffs admitted
the release and receipt of consideration but alleged that the
release was valid only for property damages to the automobile of
the plaintiff.49 The defendant moved for judgment on the plead-
45. 167 SE2d at 618. (The emphasis was added by the supreme court)
46. Wilson v. American Cas. Co., 166 S.E2d 797 (S.C. 1969. See p. 500
sutpra.
47. 168 S.E2d 306 (S.C. 1969).
48. 251 S.C. 456, 163 S.E.2d 217 (1968).
49. The plaintiffs also replied that the release was procured either upon
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ings with respect to both actions on the grounds that the plain-
tiffs had acknowledged the execution of the release and consid-
eration but had failed to allege that they had restored or offered
to restore the consideration admittedly received. 0 In the event
the motion be denied, the defendant moved for the issue of the
validity of the release to be tried first and separately. Judge
Wade S. Weatherford denied both motions and defendant ap-
pealed therefrom.
Pursuant to the allegations in the reply, Mr. Jones did not seek
property damages to his automobile. However, apparently
through inadvertence, he did make a statement appearing in the
transcript of his case only which indicated that damages for his
vehicle were sought. The supreme court announced that the case
would be reviewed in the same light in which it was presented to
the lower court to determine if the lower court had erred. For
authority on the matter, the supreme court employed the prin-
ciple established by Forbes v. Hingan c Go.51 that "to hold that a
statement made in a transcript or record which is not sustained
by the record is conclusive would be illogical." 52 In accordance
therewith, the court proclaimed that a motion for judgment on
the pleadings "should be sustained only where they are so de-
fective that the court is authorized, taking all the facts to be ad-
mitted, in concluding that no cause of action is stated entitling
the plaintiff to relief."53 Accordingly, the court announced that
plaintiff's pleadings were not fatally defective even though the
execution of the release, and the receipt and retention of the con-
sideration therefore, were admitted.
V. IssuEs UNmSOLVED Iw LowER COURT
In wfwiling v. MaDougalZ"4 the defendant, through a habeas
corpus petition, challenged on several grounds his conviction and
sentence to death. The lower court, pursuant to agreement by the
parties, passed upon only one of the issues involved, reserving
the remaining issues for later determination. On appeal the su-
preme court was of the opinion that an adjudication of the one
50. Taylor v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 196 S.C. 195, 12 S.E2d 708
(1940), established the principle that when a party wishes to avoid a duly
executed release, he must restore the other party to his original position by
returning or offering to return the consideration received under the compromise.
51. 174 S.C. 24, 176 S.E. 880 (1934).
52. Id. at 31, 176 S.E. at 883.
53. 163 S.E.2d at 219, quoting Walter J. Klein Co. v. Kneece, 239 S.C. 478,
483, 123 S.E.2d 870, 873 (1962).
54. 167 S.E.2d 432 (S.C. 1969).
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issue presented would not dispose of all the issues involved in the
proceedings. Moreover, a partial disposition of issues before the
lower court, resulting in piecemeal appeals, is not favored. There-
fore, the case was removed from a lower court determination of
all the grounds of the petition in order that a single appeal could
dispose of all the issues involved.
VI. NEcEssITy OF ADnmENcn, To THmoRy EPLoYEJ Bimow
The requirement of adhering on appeal to the same theory em-
ployed in the lower court was enunciated in MeCIZary . Wither-
spoon.s5 This action to partition land was heard by a special re-
feree. The trial judge reversed the report of the special referee,
basing the reversal upon a theory other than the one employed
by the defendant before the referee.
The supreme court reversed the lower court's holding and re-
stored the decision of the referee. The court noted the principle
that adherence to the theory on which the case was tried below is
required on review, then reaffirmed its applicability to appeals to
the circuit court from the report of a master or referee. 6
VII. INTmaRERENC Wr JURORS
In Zorm v. 6rawford57 the plaintiff's intestate, his 15-year old
daughter, was killed when an oncoming automobile suddenly
turned to the left into the path of the vehicle in which she was
riding in order to avoid colliding with the rear of the defendant's
;mproperly lighted farm tractor. The jury returned a verdict for
the plaintiff in the amount of $250,000 and the defendant ap-
pealed contending that the trial court erred in refusing his mo-
tion for a new trial on the grounds that the jurors were subjected
to improper outside influence during their deliberation. The in-
cident occurred when a number of people, including a deputy
sheriff who testified for the plaintiff in the case, were standing
outside the jury room. The foreman of the jury requested the
bailiff to bring some ashtrays to the jury room. The bailiff, with
the assistance of the deputy sheriff, took several ashtrays to the
door of the jury room where they placed them on the floor.
Neither the bailiff nor the deputy said anything to the jury, nor
did they actually enter the jury room.
55. 251 S.C. 523, 164 S.E2d 220 (1968).
56. For authority the court cited White v. Livingston, 231 S.C. 301, 98
S.E.2d 534 (1957).
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The supreme court announced that whether a new trial should
be granted upon such grounds was a question addressed to the
discretion of the trial judge, and his decision thereon would not
be reversed unless there was clear evidence of abuse of such dis-
cretion."8 The court concluded that the trial judge had not
abused his discretion in this instance.
The defendant also argued in his brief that the trial judge
erred in refusing his motion for "a new trial nisi on the ground
that the verdict was so excessive as to shock the conscience of the
court and was the result of passion or prejudice .... ,,59 The
plaintiff countered by arguing that a motion for a new trial nisi
because of excessiveness is a question not subject to review by the
supreme court.60
The court stated that, when deciding whether an exception pre-
sents a question for review, the court in construing the exception
is governed by the general principle set forth in McMahan v.
Walwlua Light & Power Co.6:
When this Court comes to construe an exception, it will
make its construction as liberal as the language will al-
low, in order to decide the question involved, unless it is
satisfied that the statement has [misled] the respondent
to his injury.
62
The court conceded that refusal to grant a new trial nisi is not
subject to review. Yet the grounds upon which the defendant
based his motion made it clear that he was really seeking a new
trial absolute. Since the plaintiff was not misled by the con-
fused terminology in the defendant's exception, the court pro-
ceeded to consider the substance of the contention. The court then
expressed a reluctance to interfere with the exercise of the jury's
discretion in fixing the amount to be awarded. However, it was
resolved that where the amount of compensation was assessed on
intangible elements of damage, the 15-year-old deceased having
had no earning capacity, there must be some limitation on the
amount to be awarded in such cases.63 Thus, the verdict was
deemed to be excessive and a new trial was granted.
58. Davis v. Littlefield, 97 S.C. 171, 81 S.E. 487 (1914).
59. 165 S.E.2d at 644.
60. Brief for Respondent at 11-12.
61. 102 S.C. 57, 86 S.E. 194 (1915).
62. Id. at 60, 86 S.E. at 195.
63. Nelson v. Charleston & W.C. Ry., 231 S.C. 351, 98 S.F_.2d 798 (1957).
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VIII. ABANDONMENT OF MOTION OR OBJECTION
The case of State v. Prather" involved the failure of counsel
to pursue a final ruling on his motion. The defendants, father
and son, were charged with murder. At trial their attorney
moved for the first time that the indictments be quashed and de-
fendants be indicted separately. The motion was based on the
contention that there might be defenses in the trial of one de-
fendant that would prejudice the rights of the other. Judge John
Grimball overruled the motion, but stated that he would give
leave to the defense attorney to look over the law on the matter
and reopen the issue the following morning. Declining this op-
portunity to research the issue, the defense counsel announced
that the defendants were ready to proceed. He failed to urge his
motion further nor did he call it to the attention of the court in
any way when the case was called for trial three days later. Sub-
sequently the defendants were convicted and sentenced to life im-
prisonment.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the judgment
of the lower court, but reached this conclusion after stating that
it chose to disregard the imperfections in counsel's motion and his
failure to press for a final ruling. This was one of several cases
in which the court noted errors of counsel but disregarded them.
IX. PICiPAL CONTENTION NOT SuBrMrD
The effect of failing by oversight to present and argue the
main issue of a case on appeal was exemplified in NortA Carolina
Hut. Life Ins. Co. v. Callahan.6 5 In that case the plaintiff in-
stituted an action for the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage.
Defendant's answer alleged that the note and mortgage were void,
and four defenses thereto were set out.60 A special referee found
that the defendant had failed to establish any defense to the ac-
tion and recommended foreclosure. The circuit court affirmed
the findings of the referee. On appeal, the defendant abandoned
the four defenses set forth in his answer and claimed instead a
failure of consideration. The court unceremoniously rejected the
appeal.
64. 164 S.E2d 756 (S.C. 1968).
65. 167 S.E.2d 626 (S.C. 1969).
66. They were: (1) defendant's signature was obtained by fraud and deceit;
(2) defendant was ignorant of the contents of the papers when she signed
them; (3) the mortgage was signed before only one witness; and (4) the
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X. COND ONAL R -MTFtJ
In SeZers v. Sears Roebck & Co.67 the defendant contracted
to make improvements to plaintiff's home for a consideration of
$3,018.63. Defendant furnished sound materials and a licensed
contractor pursuant to the obligations of the contract but failed
to perform its obligations in a workmanlike manner. The plain-
tiff paid for all but $1,821.91 and sued for actual and punitive
damages for the unworkmanlike installation of the aluminum
sidings. The defendant answered with a general denial and a
counterclaim for the remaining due and unpaid balance of
$1,821.91.
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of
$5,000. Upon motion of defendant, the trial judge granted a new
trial unless plaintiff remitted upon $1,500 of the amount of the
verdict. Plaintiff remitted upon condition "that if the defendant
elects to appeal the said court order, then the plaintiff hereby re-
serves any and all rights to appeal that portion of the said court
order which required that plaintiff remit .... ." Defendant and
plaintiff both appealed.
The supreme court relied on the principle established in Strick-
land v. Priwe8 to reach a conclusion. That case held that where
the prevailing party "fails to remit in accordance with the order
granting a new trial nisi, the effect of the order is to grant a new
trial absolute. '69 In the present case defendant's appeal served
to abrogate plaintiff's remission because plaintiff had specifical-
ly conditioned the remission upon the absence of an appeal by de-
fendant. The court further noted that the order for a new trial
was based upon the ground that the verdict of $5000 was not re-
sponsive to the evidence in the case and was excessive, and such
an order for a new trial is not appealable. Therefore, since a new
trial absolute had been granted by the lower court upon unap-
pealable grounds, the appeal was dismissed.
XI. SuFnov-woyu or ORAL NoTric oF INaURY
The validity for Workmen's Compensation purposes of an oral
notice of an injury arose in the case of Sandera v. Richardson.7"
The plaintiff-employee brought an action against the defendant-
67. 166 S.E2d 1 (S.C. 1969).
68. 247 S.C. 497, 148 S.E2d 161 (1966).
69. Id. at 449, 148 S.E2d at 162 (1966).
70. 251 S.C. 325, 162 S.E2d 257 (1968).
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employer for injuries sustained in the course of his employment.
The lower court affirmed an award of the Industrial Commission
in favor of the plaintiff by deciding that defendant had notice
of plaintiff's injury even though plaintiff did not give written
notice within thirty days as required by statute7
1
The supreme court reversed on the grounds that the Industrial
Commission had no basis in the evidence for its holding that the
employer had actual notice of the injury. The court's unan-
imous holding showed no hestitation in reversing the conclusion
of the hearing examiner, the Industrial Commission, and the
lower court.
XII. SuPrmem Cou-T DECISioN oF Issun OF FACT
In Caulder v. KnOQr' 2 the plaintiff asserted that defendant's in-
testate had made an oral contract to devise land to plaintiff. The
master in equity and the circuit judge ruled in favor of plaintiff,
holding that a contract had been established, and ordered the de-
fendants to convey the property to plaintiff.
In reversing the lower court's decision, the supreme court ex-
pressed its view that the proof in the case was not clear, cogent,
and convincing, nor did it compel conviction that the contract
was actually made. Consequently, the appellate court failed to
limit itself to deciding whether there was any support for the
trial court's decision in the evidence. Instead, the court acted sub-
stantially like a trial court, deciding the issue of fact for itself.
XIII. APPEL.r PROCEDUrm
Supreme Court Rule 8(9), prescribing deadlines for the filing
of briefs, has been revised.7 3 Time for filing is now tied to the
docketing of the transcript of record, not the commencement of
the court's monthly term.
DONALD V. MEms
71. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 72-301 (1962).
72. 251 S.C. 337, 162 S.E2d 262 (1968).
73. S.C. Sip. CT. R. 8(9). The new rule took effect June 16, 1969. See
Smith's Advance Sheet Number 19 (May 17, 1969). Rule 22, relating to
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